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Abstract 
Describes the various types of outsourcing arrangements used in information systems, 
and explains some of the theoretical perspectives invoked to explain the behaviour of 
client, supplier, and intermediary organisations, such as client consortia. Examines some 
of the problems of outsourcing in the public sector, and suggests how some of the 
theoretical perspectives might illuminate some of the problems which have emerged in 
the purchasing and licensing of electronic content.  
Introduction 
Many of the collaborative deals for purchasing electronic information resources 
inevitably mean that some of the work that might be done in-house on review and 
monitoring of library resources has been delegated to an outside agency. There are 
benefits, obviously, in such deals, in providing access to resources that would otherwise 
be beyond the budget capabilities of an institution. On the other hand, some of the 
competencies that are possibly less obvious in normal collection development activities 
may be lost when purchasing work is effectively outsourced. Information technology (IT) 
outsourcing is a major part of the information management scene in many private and 
public sector bodies. It is defined, with some variations, as a decision taken by an 
organisation to contract out or sell all, or some of the organisation’s IT assets, people or 
activities to a third party supplied, who in exchange provides and manages assets and 
services, for an agreed fee or other monetary arrangement over an agreed time period 
(Kern & Willcocks, 2000). While collaborative purchasing, regional or national deals, do 
not involve transfer of IT assets, there is some delegation of activities, or re-arrangement 
of activities which involved some changes to the way library services are organised, the 
type of competencies required, and relationships with suppliers. Outsourcing theory can 
be used to explore some of the implications of these contractual arrangements. The aim 
of this paper is to outline the various theoretical perspectives, and discuss their 
applicability to collaborative purchasing.  
 
Aims of outsourcing 
The type of outsourcing favoured is partly governed by the underlying aims for 
outsourcing in the first place. The aims are usually concerned with better cost control, 
which assumes that in-house costs are known precisely beforehand, although that is not 
always the case. In some cases the outsourcing is concerned more with gaining access to 
technical expertise which may not be available in the outsourcing organisation. There 
may be an emphasis on time saving for some organisations (cost control in terms of staff 
time costs). Increasingly, perhaps, many outsourcing relationships are becoming 
partnerships as outsourcing becomes an accepted way of conducting business, and 
relationships between those involved develop over time (Grover, Teng, & Cheon, 1998). 
 
Types of outsourcing 
Currie & Willcocks (1998) distinguish four types of outsourcing in their research on 
outsourcing approaches: 
• total outsourcing 
• multiple supplier outsourcing 
• joint venture/strategic alliance outsourcing  
• insourcing 
 
Total outsourcing involves developing a partnership with a single supplier, with IT 
perceived as a service or support function. The aim is usually to reduce IT costs, or 
eliminate a problem IT function, but the outsourcing organisation retains strategic 
control. Multiple supplier sourcing is less concerned with partnerships as the aim is to 
foster innovation and create competition between suppliers, although it is recognised that 
suppliers will form alliances among themselves for bidding purposes. Contracts are 
usually short-term, and the client co-ordinates a portfolio of services from various 
suppliers, with the aim of retaining strategic control. Joint venture/strategic alliance 
outsourcing is more concerned with development of new knowledge for the client, and 
there is more emphasis on shared risks and rewards. Sometimes various organisations 
will foster the creation of a supplier company to which they will outsource work, but still 
have more control than they would do in a multiple supplier or total outsourcing 
arrangement. Insourcing, or keeping the IT department and services in-house, occurs 
when organisations view IT as core to their business, or when they mistrust possible 
suppliers. A more recent type of outsourcing is the ASP (application service provider) 
model, where organisations purchase software use on an ‘as and when’ basis (Kern, 
Kreijger, & Willcocks, 2002). 
 
The above list of types of outsourcing arrangements describes the various formats which 
have emerged. Reasons for outsourcing vary, and the conceptual frameworks (Grover et 
al., 1998; Elitzur & Wensley, 1998; Hancox & Hackney, 2000; Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
which have been used to explain the practice and degree of success obtained include: 
• core competencies 
• resource-based theory  
• resource-dependent theory  
• transaction cost theory  (TCT)  
• agency cost 
• partnerships  
• game theory  
 
As might be expected, none of these approaches explains all the behaviour observed in 
practice in outsourcing contracts, although most explain some of the behaviour, and help 
to predict the likely success of some outsourcing arrangements. 
Core competencies 
How core competencies are defined is unclear, but the essence is that core competencies 
should be kept in-house, but that other things that the organisation does, which are not 
deemed core, or critical to its mission or function, should be considered for outsourcing. 
Technical services such as bookbinding have been outsourced by many libraries for many 
years, and few would argue, except for particular specialist libraries, that bookbinding is 
not usually a core competence. Cataloguing, on the other hand, might be viewed 
differently, although many libraries buy in records or outsource retrospective catalogue 
conversion. Cataloguing might be deemed a ‘core competence’ of librarians, but whether 
that requires them to conduct it individually, site by site, is debatable. The perspective of 
core and non-core competencies starts to look less useful when the mission and main 
functions of the client organisation are changing, along with the skills required of its 
staff. The core competency perspective is useful in prompting serious consideration about 
the functions which are truly cost-effectively done in-house, and those which could be 
outsourced, without any loss to future requirements in expertise. The core competency 
perspective is less useful when some of the functions are core, but some, or most of the 
tasks involved could be outsourced as it would be cheaper to do that. For purchasing 
arrangements, libraries often need to consider the effects on staff functions, of sharing or 
delegating the work of previewing serials prior to purchase with other members of a 
purchasing consortium. 
Resource-based theory 
According to resource based theory, organisations wish to maintain a distinctive product 
(competitive advantage) and will plug gaps in resources and capabilities in the most cost-
effective manner to do so. Outsourcing of cataloguing is easier to rationalise using 
resource-based theory as this emphasises that cost-effective solutions are required to 
some of the major activities, in order to fulfil the main aim of the organisation (provide 
organised access to resources). 
Resource-dependent theory 
With resource dependent theory, the environment of the organisation is almost as 
important as the organisation itself. The principle is that organisations adopt strategies to 
gain access to critical resources, to stabilise relationships with the external environment 
and to secure survival. With this theory, collaborative licensing deals are easy to 
rationalise. Collaboration allows access to resources (more effectively and more 
efficiently than without), deals lessen the problems of negotiations with many publishers 
on an individual basis, and survival (managing diminishing budgetary resources) is more 
assured. Some individual choice over selection has gone, but more is gained for 
apparently less effort in staff time. 
Transaction cost theory (TCT) 
With TCT, a more conventional economic approach is used. Organisations may buy from 
the market, or develop in-house, and decisions are based on the relative cost, composed 
of the costs of production, and costs of the transaction, of the exchange. TCT considers 
the asset specificity (to what extent can an asset, such as specialised software or product, 
be redeployed), uncertainty in the environment, as well as the frequency of the 
transaction. Taking a very simple example, is it better to use a breadmaker to make bread 
at home or buy bread in the supermarket? Having invested in the breadmaker, and gained 
some skills, can these skills (and the breadmaker) be used for other purposes (asset 
specificity)? How likely is that the supermarket where I would buy the bread would 
close, or alter its stocklines? And lastly, it would not be worth setting up special 
arrangements to buy a loaf of particular grade and quality for one individual, although a 
client with a large and frequent order arrangements might require special contract 
conditions (frequency of transaction). 
 
For information services and systems the transaction costs concern the costs involved in 
setting up and monitoring the contract, as opposed to the costs of doing the work in-house 
and producing the service or product in-house. If the decision is made to outsource, then 
the aim is to reduce those transaction costs as much as possible, and that can be done by 
collaborative working with other institutions, who require a similar product or service, to 
share the work involved in setting up and monitoring the contract. The transaction cost 
theory (TCT) perspective is useful in examining the contributions to transaction costs, 
and how these might be reduced. 
Agency cost theory (ACT) 
Agency cost theory expands on one aspect of TCT, as it deals with the different 
perspectives of risk that client and supplier have, and differentiates between outcome-
based contracts, and behaviour-based contracts. If the client distrusts the supplier then the 
extent of monitoring required will be greater for the client, than it would be if the client 
could wholly trust the supplier to deliver. The client has two main choices: a contract 
which stipulates payment by results (an outcome-based contract), or a contract that states 
the supplier should do certain things at stipulated times, or spend a certain amount of time 
on certain functions. If one cannot trust a supplier to deliver a product some months down 
the line, then it might pay to ensure that it looks as if they are doing something. On the 
supplier side, a behaviour-based contract at least allows them to claim that they did spend 
x hours on this task, even if the outcome could not be achieved as originally intended. 
Agency cost theory helps to distinguish the most productive and fairest method of 
minimising risks for both client and supplier. 
Partnerships  
Partnerships are not one theory but some of the outsourcing research has examined the 
development of trust between client and supplier, usually based on aspects of 
organisation theory, social exchange theory or social contract theory. Partnerships are not 
totally altruistic arrangements and there is usually some element of exchange (if you do 
this for me, I’ll do that for you). One problem for public sector outsourcing arrangements 
is the need for transparency and accountability, which makes partnership working 
difficult to reconcile with the apparent prohibition on becoming too cosy with the outside 
supplier. Closer relationships were easier when common cultures were shared in an 
internal market (Hancox & Hackney, 2000) 
Game theory 
Game theory has its origin in economics, and has been used, for example, to develop 
concepts such as the evolutionary stable strategy for a species (Smith, 1982). Game 
theory applied to outsourcing uses the idea that it may make sense for one party to cheat 
on the other, but whether this is a successful strategy in the longterm depends on the 
reaction of the client. The evolution of co-operation (Axelrod, 1997) may depend on the 
results of several interactions (of the Prisoner’s Dilemma format) in which two players 
have an opportunity to co-operate or defect, with different payoffs. The game theory 
perspective is a reminder that it is not necessarily in your partner’s best interest to co-
operate with you. The strategies of players (client and supplier) depend on their beliefs 
concerning the motives of the other, but the information game may be asymmetric in that 
one can cheat on the other. 
Outsourcing information systems in the public sector 
Case studies (Lacity & Willcocks, 1997)and analysis of outsourcing strategies (Cronk & 
Sharp, 1998) suggest that the following types of situation are common in the public 
sector environment: 
• public sector IS managers are constrained by highly political influences and 
external stakeholders, as well as having to consider the internal constraints; 
• senior government officials assume (often wrongly) that outsourcing to the private 
sector saves money; 
• some public sector organisations can combine forces to act as a consortium 
purchasing client. 
 
In some circumstances, the low risk route to outsourcing success depends on outsourcing 
IS activities that are technically mature, stable, not highly integrated and for which the 
supplier can achieve economies of scale, and can offer superior technical expertise for 
support. The organisation should practise hands-on management of the contract, which 
should be of a duration which matches the known requirements. In some cases the client 
(or consortium client) may possess expertise that the supplier does not possess and this 
should be recognised. 
 
The type of interactions encountered in a relationship between client and supplier include 
(Kern & Willcocks, 2000) 
• product/service exchange 
• financial exchange 
• service enforcement and monitoring 
• communication/information exchange 
• cultural adaptation 
• investments in resources, knowledge and time 
• sharing, and adaptation of vision 
• social and personal bonds. 
 
The research conducted by suggests that management efforts need to focus on the main 
game, the client’s objectives, as set out in the contract. In time, the relationship should 
evolve providing closer convergence and additional value in benefits to both, though at 
the danger of losing the focus on initial objectives. 
 
Research on outsourcing in the library, information and archives sector in the UK has 
investigated some of the activities of library purchasing consortia (Ball & Pye, 2000) and 
later studies (Ball et al., 2002) have developed a decision matrix to assess the feasibility 
of outsourcing. 
Developing a framework for purchasing and licensing of electronic information 
Electronic information services and products are different in many respects from 
information systems purchases which are concerned to a greater extent with hardware and 
software support, although the problem of archiving means that hardware and software 
considerations do have to be included. As with information systems in general: 
• library and information service managers are subject to  
o political influences (e.g. widening participation agendas may increase 
pressures for educational institutions to buy resources that can be 
networked for offcampus use) 
o external stakeholders (advisory or standard-setting bodies, for example) 
o internal constraints (a major difficulty with devolved budgeting) 
• senior officials may assume that licensing deals and collaborative purchasing 
saves money (but take less account of the time required to arrange, monitor and 
evaluate the arrangements), as well as space, if electronic resources are purchased 
rather than print) 
• public sector organisations in LIS can and do form consortia. 
 
The PURCEL report(Education for Change Ltd for PURCEL consortium, 2000) 
identified the following issues at workshop discussions on purchasing and licensing of 
electronic resources in the higher education sector: 
• HE sector wide issues (institutional missions and strategies, cultures of funding) 
• Budgets, costs and value (attributing costs to devolved budgets, estimating and 
forecasting budgets for electronic resources, the year-end factor) 
• Collection development policies (to be led by content or driven by format?) 
• Pre-purchase evaluation 
• Purchase decision making processes (who should be involved, complexity of 
deals, time factors) 
• Post-purchase evaluation 
• Licensing (failure to comply with model licence, bundling/unbundling of 
electronic and print) 
• Role and tasks of the library staff (and to this should be added the role and tasks 
of the IT staff). 
 
Many of these problems are ongoing and the JUSTEIS (Urquhart, 2002) report confirms 
the seemingly intractable nature of problems concerned with the publisher pricing 
models, site licences and digital preservation and archiving, with local collaboration and 
consortia dealing possibly detrimental to national deals. Using the interaction model 
outlined above ((Kern & Willcocks, 2000), many of the difficulties between client 
(library/purchasing consortium) and the supplier (publisher) have focused on the  
• product/service exchange (debates about bundling, unbundling and preservation) 
• financial exchange (pricing models for electronic resources) 
• service enforcement and monitoring (debates on standards for usage statistics). 
Some, emphasis is apparent for: 
• communication/information exchange 
• cultural adaptation 
• investments in resources, knowledge and time 
although the concerns are often limited at this stage to the actual licensing arrangements, 
and often on the relationships within the consortia, and there has been less time to 
evaluate the impact on the users in higher and further education institutions. 
 
The remaining types of interaction concern changing relationships between libraries and 
publishers and publishers and the partnership is strained when librarians face what are 
seemingly exorbitant rises in journal prices (Halliday & Oppenheim, 2001) 
• sharing, and adaptation of vision 
• social and personal bonds. 
 
In these circumstances, with so many problems, the role of theory might be to crystallise 
the problem, and in doing so to move forward. Taking a few of the problems which 
emerged during the JUSTEIS work and reflect those reported in PURCEL, how does 
theory relate to these?  
 
First - the problem of the pricing bands and catering for the needs of smaller institutions 
and the larger, often research-intensive institutions, means that there are different 
perspectives on the deal. The goals may be quite different as the smaller institutions may 
be operating more in resource-dependent theory mode, with greater emphasis on the need 
to cater for multiple stakeholders (further education colleges may cater for a wide variety 
of courses, and have a community role, for example). The smaller institutions wish to 
gain access to resources, and to ensure that they provide what is required for their users. 
Research-intensive institutions, and the departments within them, may be operating 
according to resource-based theory, where the aim is to gain a competitive advantage 
(over rival institutions) by entering into an outsourcing arrangement. They are looking for 
a cost-effective solution, just as the smaller institutions are, but the ultimate goals may be 
different. One would not want to suggest that both sets of partners in a consortium needs 
to operate using some of the game theory rules but they need to be quite clear about what 
they expect to gain from the consortium arrangement, as the consortium has to negotiate 
with publishers. Arguably, the licences should consider not just the bands, but the 
different goals that institutions joining one band may have from institutions that are likely 
to opt for another band. 
 
Second, some of the problems are concerned with conditions for the purchasing deals. 
Individual institutions find these restrictive, but publishers, of course, demand some 
continuity in their funding. There are risks involved for both, and agency cost theory 
distinguishes between behaviour and outcome-based contracts. Perhaps a little more 
consideration needs to be given to ways in which behaviour or actions on the part of both 
publishers and library consortia might help to build trust between them, as suggested by 
Russell (2001) (Le Moal, 2002). 
 
Last, but not least, the costs of setting up and monitoring the arrangements. Certainly 
consortia purchasing reduces some costs in individual institutions but there are other staff 
costs that need to be considered when changing the way collection management is done. 
Transaction cost theory emphasises that transaction costs should be minimised, to a 
boring level, possibly (Fritsch et al., 2002)otherwise there is the danger that it would as 
cheap, if not cheaper, to bring back the operation in-house. Transaction cost theory also 
indicates that the cost of setting up an outsourcing arrangement is unlikely to be 
beneficial if it is not going to be a frequent occurrence. A difficulty with some of the 
regional deal-making is that there may be much staff time expended in such 
arrangements, and little to show for it if there is some regional reorganisation of 
institutions. The health sector provides a good example of that. Regional consortia were 
established to buy databases, using the Regional Health Authority structures as a basis. 
When the Department of Health reorganised, new arrangements had to be made. 
Conclusions 
Outsourcing arrangements vary considerably and the complication for consideration of 
the effects on the relationship between the library and the publisher is that many of the 
deals are done through intermediary organisations or library consortia. That in itself 
means that libraries are dealing with other libraries as well as with publishers, and there 
may be levels of outsourcing to be considered. First, when dealing with the consortium 
arrangement, the library may need to consider the effects on core competencies in terms 
of staff skills, as well as the different perspectives on the ultimate goal for the institution 
of the consortium arrangement. Second, when considering the arrangements between the 
consortium and the publisher supplier, various theories such as transaction cost theory, 
and agency cost theory help to illustrate some of the attitudes towards risk of the partners 
involved and the way the costs of negotiation might be minimised. There seems little 
need for partnership theories at this stage, but perhaps some of the social exchange ideas 
need to be explored if the library-publisher relationship is to be productive for both 
parties. Within their own institutions libraries increasingly need to consider the publishers 
in their midst, the staff and researchers who are publishing on their own pages, and 
exploring open access models of publishing. Perhaps partnerships need to be explored 
between libraries and their in-house publishers? 
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